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RETHINKING LEGAL CONSERVATISM
NEAL K. KATYAL*
I appreciate so much the invitation to contribute to this debate, and before I gently chide my colleagues for what they
have been doing for the last few .years, I want to offer some
words of praise. First, as to Professor Randy Barnett, who was
described as the "intellectual godfather" of the health care challenge,' he is also the person right now who is making law professors relevant again to the real world. It is a wonderful example that he has set for the legal academy. Second, let me say
a word about my dear friend Paul Clement, who was described
by Judge Sykes at the outset of this panel as "one of the finest
Supreme Court advocates." I actually think he is the finest Supreme Court advocate practicing today. For anyone who did
not hear those three days of the health care argument and listen
to him, I have not heard a more marvelous set of arguments in
my life, and it was quite a spectacular thing to see.
The timing of this convention is auspicious. I suspect that I
am much happier than most members of the Federalist Society
at this particular moment, but I am not here to gloat.2 1 am really here to say that members of the Federalist Society should be
happy, particularly if you take seriously the notion that the
* Partner, Hogan Lovells; Paul and Patricia Saunders Professor of National Security Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Acting Solicitor General of the
United States, 2010-11; Principal Deputy Solicitor General of the United States,
2009-11.
This Essay was adapted from remarks given during a panel discussion of the
2012 Federalist Society National Lawyer's Convention held in November 2012 in
Washington, D.C. For an audio and video recording of the complete panel, please
visit the Federalist Society's website. Federalism and Federal Power, FEDERALIST
SoC'Y (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/federalism-andfederal-power-event-audiovideo.
1. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20US/
politics/20states.html; Josh Blackman, Barnett on the New Deal Settlement, the New
Federalism, and the ConstitutionalGestalt after NFIB, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG, (Feb.

21, 2013),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/02/21/bamett-on-the-new-dealsettlement-the-new-federalism-and-the-constitutional-gestalt-after-nfib/.
2. The remarks took place on Thursday, November 15, 2012. President Obama
had won his campaign for reelection the previous Tuesday, November 6, 2012.
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Federalist Society stands for taking the law back and returning
government to the people. From that vantage point, I suggest
that the 2012 election will serve those principles well. The reason is not the trite notion that "Obama is better," but goes back
to what Professor Barnett noted about the two essential strands
in the Federalist Society.3 One is the strand that he called "judicial conservatism," the tradition of judicial restraint. The other,
which he embraces, he labels "constitutional conservatism" the idea that the third branch of government must robustly enforce constitutional principles,4 apart from any tradition of deference to the elected branches.
When I was in law school, it seemed that the Federalist Society had won the argument by standing for the first principle, the
tradition of judicial restraint. That principle deeply influenced
my generation of lawyers: Judges are unelected, and if there is
doubt as to whether a law is unconstitutional, those judges
should defer to political processes. I believed that was what the
Federalist Society stood for. It was a deeply held and powerful
belief, and it influenced my entire generation of law students
and what we wound up doing afterwards.
I see today a total breakdown in that basic philosophy, and it
is visible even in Professor Barnett's eloquent work. In his
books on the Ninth Amendment, 5 which are marvelous (and
marvelously wrong), or in his celebration of the Supreme
Court's refusal to accept the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act on Commerce Clause grounds-even though that Act
regulated seventeen percent of the gross domestic productone begins to wonder what is left of the tradition of judicial restraint. Indeed, the arguments in Professor Barnett's book are
not much different from those sometimes advocated by the last
Carmack Waterhouse Professor at Georgetown, Mark Tushnet.
There is a deep similarity in the structure of the argument that
the constitutional conservatives and many traditional liberals
have been making about the role of the judiciary in policing
state and federal boundaries.

3. See Randy E. Barnett, The Wages of Crying Judicial Restraint, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 925, 930-31 (2013).
4. Id. at 930.
5. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT vol. 1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1991); RANDY
E. BARNETT, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT, vol. 2 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993).
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There is a sense that everyone has lost their bearings a little
bit. Even the Chief Justice's opinion in National Federationof Independent Business v. Sebelius suffers from these problems. Its
first pages begin with the point that Professor Barnett discusses: the idea that there is no precedent for the health care legislation and it is therefore presumptively unconstitutional. 6 Call
this doctrine the antinovelty canon. The Chief Justice says,
"Sometimes 'the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem... is the lack of historical precedent' for Congress' action."' 7 Neither the majority opinion nor the United
States has located any historical analogs for this novel structure. That is step one (and it borrowed heavily from Chief Justice Roberts's very recent opinion for the Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board). Step
two of the opinion states, in effect, "Do not worry about the
constitutional problem because I can rewrite the statute in a
way that makes it constitutional." 8 Chief Justice Roberts thus
used a saving construction, which itself borrowed heavily from
his very recent opinion for the Court in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder,9 where the Court
rewrote a statute-in that case, the Voting Rights Act-to make
it constitutional.
The antinovelty canon and rewriting power, however, are at
war with one another. The former posits that novel statutes are
constitutionally disfavored; the latter ensures that the Court
can fashion a statute so novel that it has not even once been
enacted. They both suffer from their own flaws. The
antinovelty canon, which holds that something is presumptively unconstitutional simply because it has not been done before,
is not anchored in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution. It sounds very much like something called a "penumbra"
that other Justices alluded to in the 1960s. 10 What is more, the
antinovelty canon is contrary to perhaps the most important

6. Compare Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-91 (2012),
with Barnett, supra note 2, at 928-29.
7. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct at 2586 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010)).
8. See, e.g., id. at 2594-2600.
9. See Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 567 U.S. 193 (2009).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.").

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 36

and foundational Supreme Court opinion ever, McCulloch v.
Maryland."
The Chief Justice's second step was to rewrite the statute to
save it from constitutional difficulty, which is a move that in
general does not, and should not, insulate it from criticism on
grounds of judicial activism. After all, this step requires the
Court to author a statute that has literally never been enacted
before. This rewriting is similar to what happened with the
Voting Rights Act and its bailout provision. Nobody believed
that the Act's bailout provision meant what the Court said it
did, but that is the interpretation that the Court ultimately upheld. 12 A similar type of outcome came in the Affordable Care
Act case, and the result of it is that we now have an opinion
blessing a statute that is so unprecedented that literally nobody
has ever enacted it in American history.' 3 This approach strikes
me as the wrong one to take.
The debate about judicial activism has resonated with the
same tired mantras for years. Essentially, judicial activism appears to be nothing more than a charge lobbed at a decision
that a certain group of people do not like. The response to that
charge is equally pedestrian: "Oh, that's not being activist because that was clearly unconstitutional, and the Court is simply
returning to the tradition of constitutional restraint." That response is what the left said for forty years when they defended
all sorts of decisions by the Warren Court striking down statutes. It is now what conservatives are saying when the current
Supreme Court strikes down legislation that conservatives disfavor. Activism is the charge levied at the last judicial decision
that one did not like. It is time to end that debate and return to
a more precise definition of the perils of judicial activism.
There is a path forward. It is a solution that has been around
since 1893. It is James Bradley Thayer's solution: If something
is not clearly unconstitutional, courts should defer to the political branches. 14 Professor Barnett and I can disagree about the
Affordable Care Act, or any number of other pieces of legisla11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (asserting that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
12. See Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One, 567 U.S. at 206-11.
13. See Nat'l Fed. ofindep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595-2600.
14. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DocTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893).
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tion, but it seems to me that it is important to return to that
idea of judicial restraint as an impulse, a disposition, a way of
thinking about the role of a judge in our tripartite system of
government. That notion holds that because the judiciary is the
branch of government that is unelected, we should be suspicious of it and we should try to ensure that, unless something
is clearly unconstitutional, the courts should not use judicial
review as a license to strike down legislation with which they
happen to disagree.
In that sense, the 2012 election really is good news for the
Federalist Society. We are currently behind the veil of ignorance. We do not know what the retirements will be on the Supreme Court. For the last eight years, the political left, when it
comes to judicial discussions, has sounded very much like the
preconfirmation Judge Bork in preaching the gospel of judicial
restraint, and conservatives have been encouraging interpretations of the Constitution that sound much more like those favored by Chief Justice Warren.
This is the time for us to think through whether an entity as
august as the Federalist Society should embrace Professor Barnett's invitation to move toward a constitutional conservatism.
It strikes me as dangerous in terms of the underlying issues,
but more importantly, as a step away from the fundamental
insight that the Federalist Society had, which was that judges
should be restrained because they lack the democratic pedigree
of the political branches. There should be an impulse of judicial
restraint, and, unless something is clearly unconstitutional,
courts should not be mucking around with legislation and declaring it unconstitutional, no matter how novel it may be.

